It is not unusual for decisions to be taken within Owners’ Associations with which the recent ruling of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court No. 182/2026, of 10 February, addresses a recurring issue in civil litigation for personal injury: the determination of the dies a quo (or start date) of the limitation period when the actual extent of the damage has not yet been fully defined from a medical standpoint.
The case concerns a claim for compensation arising from an alleged case of medical negligence, which was initially dismissed on grounds of limitation at first instance and on appeal. The disputed question was whether references contained in clinical reports framed in terms of mere “suspicion” or “probability” were sufficient to consider the limitation period as having commenced, or whether, on the contrary, such commencement ought to be deferred until a diagnostic confirmation had been reached — which, in the case at hand, took place in January 2018.
The Supreme Court reaffirms that the limitation period does not begin “whilst the injured party cannot sufficiently know the actual damage suffered, for reasons not attributable to their own conduct.” This means that a mere clinical suspicion does not suffice; what is required is a sufficiently precise and well-founded determination of the true nature of the injury and its sequelae.
The ruling places particular emphasis on the progressive nature of certain injuries, and in particular neurological injuries in minors. In such cases, the delimitation of the scope, severity and functional impact of the damage may be prolonged over time due to reasons connected to the child’s own development and the gradual manifestation of the after-effects. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to fix the commencement of the limitation period at stages of mere diagnostic uncertainty, or at a point when the damage has not yet been sufficiently determined.
From this perspective, the Supreme Court rejects the notion that the dies a quo should be fixed at the moment when the first signs of damage appear or when provisional clinical reports are issued. The determining factor is not the mere existence of the harm, but rather the moment at which it becomes sufficiently defined to allow a well-founded claim to be brought.
Furthermore, the judgment underlines that, whilst in certain cases an administrative resolution recognising disability may serve as a reference point for the commencement of the limitation period, it does not automatically constitute the dies a quo if the damage was not sufficiently determined from a clinical perspective. Even accepting such a reference, the Court notes that “it has been acknowledged, as the initial day of the limitation period, the issuing of certificates of incapacity or degrees of invalidity issued by the competent public authorities, insofar as these may have a bearing on the quantification of the applicable compensation.”
Otro aspecto relevante es la reiteración del carácter restrictivo con el que debe aplicarse la prescripción en materia de daños personales, por su conexión con el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva. Corresponde a quien invoca la prescripción acreditar de forma clara el momento en que la acción pudo ejercitarse, y las dudas sobre la determinación del dies a quo no deben resolverse en perjuicio del damnificado.
In sum, Supreme Court ruling 182/2026 consolidates a line of case law that is particularly valuable in forensic practice: the commencement of the limitation period cannot be brought forward to stages of diagnostic uncertainty, nor to moments at which the sequelae have not yet stabilised or been fully determined. This criterion is of particular relevance in medical liability proceedings and in claims for progressively evolving damages, where the question of limitation frequently becomes a decisive issue in the litigation.